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FAGERBERG J., VERSPAGEN B. and CANIE È LS M. (1997) Technology, growth and unemployment across European regions,
Reg. Studies 31, 457± 466. The process of convergence in GDP per capita levels across European regions came to a halt in the
1980s, although the differences in GDP per capita remain substantial. Moreover, these differences are related to similarly
persistent differences in unemployment rates. This paper argues that a perspective which, in addition to other factors, takes into
account differences across regions in innovation and diffusion of technology may explain these ® ndings. A simultaneous equation
model with GDP per capita growth, employment growth and migration as endogenous variables is proposed and estimated
using data for 64 European regions in the 1980s. The results show that innovation and the diffusion of technology are indeed
important factors behind European growth in the 1980s. However, due to a lack of own R&D capabilities, most poor regions
fail to take advantage of the more advanced technologies available elsewhere. The growth of the poor regions is also hampered
by an unfavourable industrial structure (the predominance of agriculture). As a consequence, growth of GDP per capita in the
poorer regions is not substantially faster than in the richer ones (where growth is fuelled by much larger R&D efforts and a
more advanced industrial structure). Although employment in poor regions actually grows somewhat faster than in the rich
ones, so does labour supply, preventing a (relative) reduction in their rates of unemployment.
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technologie, la croissance et le cho Ã mage a Á travers les re Â gions Technologie, Wachstum und Erwerbslosigkeit in euro-
europe Â ennes, Reg. Studies 31, 457± 466. La convergence du pa È ischen Regionen, Reg. Studies 31, 457± 466. Der Vorgang
PIB par te Ã te a Á travers les re Â gions europe Â ennes fut inter- einer Konvergenz der im eigenen Land pro-Kopf erzielten
rompue aux anne Â es 1980, bien que les e Â carts du PIB par Bruttosozialproduktho È hen in europa È ischen Regionen kam
te Ã te restent non-ne Â gligeables. Qui plus est, ces e Â carts se in den achtziger Jahren zum Erliegen, obschon weiterhin
rapportent aux e Â carts des taux de cho Ã mage qui persistent betra È chtliche Unterschiede in den im eigenen Land pro-Kopf
e Â galement. Cet article laissent supposer que ces re Â sultats erzielten Bruttosoziaprodukten bestehen. Diese Unterschiede
pourraient s’expliquer a Á partir d’une approche qui met en stehen auû erdem in Bezug zu ebenso beharrlichen Unter-
conside Â ration a Á travers les re Â gions les e Â carts d’innovation et schieden in der Erwerbslosenrate. Der vorliegende Aufsatz
de diffusion de la technologie, parmi d’autres facteurs. Un vertritt die Auffassung, daû diese Befunde sich durch eine
mode Á le d’e Â quations simultane Â es comportant des variables Perspekive erkla È ren lieû en, die auû er anderen Faktoren auch
endoge Á nes, a Á savoir l’augmentation du PIB par te Ã te, la Unterschiede in Innovation und Verbreitung von Techno-
monte Â e de l’emploi et la migration, se voit proposer et logie in den Regionen in Betracht zieht. Es wird ein
estimer a Á partir des donne Â es sur soixante-quatre re Â gions Gleichungssystem des Zuwachses des im eigenen Lande
europe Â ennes aux anne Â es 1980. Les re Â sultats laissent voir que erzielten Bruttosozialprodukts, der Zunahme der Erwerbs-
l’innovation et la diffusion de la technologie sont d’impor- ta È tigkeit und der Wanderung als endogene Vera È nderliche
tants facteurs a Á l’origine de la croissance europe Â enne aux vorgeschlagen und berechnet, dem Daten der achtziger Jahre
anne Â es 1980. Toujours est-il qu’a Á de Â faut de la RetD, la fu È r 64 europa È ische Regionen zugrunde gelegt wurden. Die
plupart des re Â gions de Â favorise Â es ne pro® tent pas des techno- Ergebnisse zeigen, daû Innovation und die Verbreitung von
logies plus avance Â es qui sont disponibles ailleurs. Une struc- Technologie tatsa È chlich wichtige Faktoren sind, die hinter
ture industrielle de Â favorable empe Ã che aussi les re Â gions dem Wachstum der achtziger Jahre standen. Mangels eigener
de Â favorise Â es (vu l’importance du secteur agricole). Par con- Fa È higkeiten in Forschung und Entwicklung gelingt es jedoch
se Â quent, le PIB par te Ã te dans les re Â gions de Â favorise Â es den meisten armen Regionen nicht, Vorteile aus ho È her
n’augmente pas sensiblement plus rapidement par rapport a Á entwickelten, an anderen Orten zur Verfu È gung stehenden
celui des re Â gions plus riches (ou Á la croissance est alimente Â e Technologien zu ziehen. Das Wachstum der armen
par des efforts de RetD beaucoup plus importants et par Regionen wird zudem durch eine ungu È nstige Indu-
une structure industrielle plus avance Â e). Non seulement striestruktur (U È berwiegen der Landwirtschaft) gehemmt.
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l’emploi augmente quelque peu plus rapidement dans les Folglich nimmt das im eigenen Lande per Kopf erzielte
re Â gions de Â favorise Â es que dans les re Â gions riches, mais l’offre Bruttosozialprodukt in den a È rmeren Regionen nicht
d’emploi aussi, ce qui empe Ã che une baisse (relative) de leurs wesentlich schneller zu als in den wohlhabenderen (wo das
taux de cho Ã mage. Wachstum von weitaus gro È û eren Anstrengungen in For-
schung und Entwicklung, sowie einer ho È her entwickelten
Convergence Cho Ã mage RetD Innovation Industriestruktur angeheizt wird). Obwohl Erwerbsta È tigkeit
Croissance e Â conomique Re Â gions europe Â ennes in armem Gebieten tatsa È chlich etwas schneller als in reichen
zunimmt, trifft das Gleiche auf das Angebot an Arbeitskra È ften
zu, was eine (obschon relative) Senkung der Erwerbslosenrate
verhindert.
Konvergenz Erwerbslosigkeit
Forschung und Entwicklung Wirtschaftswachstum
Europa È ische Regionen
INTRODUCTION words diffusion is not an instantaneous and costless
process (as suggested by Solow-type models).
In an earlier paper (FAGERBERG and VERSPAGEN, During most of the post-war period, differences in
1996) it was shown that a perspective that takes differ- GDP per capita between European regions have been
ences across European regions in innovation and dif- on the decrease. Seemingly, the regions of Europe were
fusion of technology (and supporting factors) into on a steady, albeit slow, path towards convergence in
account has a good deal to offer when analysing GDP per capita. Not any more. Research shows that
growth. What we try to do in this paper is to broaden for the most recent decade (the 1980s) differences
this perspective by also taking into account differences in GDP per capita levels were essentially unchanged
in employment growth and migration ¯ ows. This can (NEVEN and GOUYETTE, 1995; FAGERBERG and
only be done in a coherent way if it is acknowledged VERSPAGEN, 1996).
1 This change in trend is not the
that variables such as GDP per capita growth, employ- result of a process through which the differences in
ment growth and migration ¯ ows are in fact interde- GDP per capita across European regions have been
pendent. We therefore adopt a framework of analysis reduced to a negligible level. On the contrary, these
that takes this into account. The results con® rm that differences remain rather substantial. In the data set we
these interdependencies are indeed strong, i.e. that the analyse below, GDP per capita in the poorest region
factors that impact on GDP per capita growth also are in 1990 was only about one-quarter of that in the
important for employment growth, and the other way richest region. Moreover, as we show in the next
around. section, these differences seem to be related to equally
persistent differences in levels of unemployment:
regions with a low level of GDP per capita tend to have
EUROPEAN REGIONS IN THE 1980s much higher unemployment and vice-versa.
2 How are
these ® ndings to be explained? This is the question we The sample consists of 64 European regions from four
address in the third section of this paper. There are, of different countries: (West) Germany, France, Italy and
course, many possible approaches that could be applied Spain. The source is the Eurostat REGIO database.
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to increase our understanding of this issue. As far as For some variables we have data for other countries as
the issue of growth is concerned, the neoclassical model well (Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK),
of economic growth (SOLOW, 1956) has been the but because these countries have missing values for
standard frame of analysis. However, it has been shown some of the key variables considered here, such as
that predictions derived from this framework are not R&D, employment or migration, we exclude them
consistent with the observed growth pattern of Euro- from the analysis. Thus, compared to our previous work
pean regions in the post-war period(SALA-I-MARTIN, (FAGERBERG and VERSPAGEN, 1996), this sample has
1996). Moreover, as argued in more depth elsewhere a more `southern twist’. The variables employed in this
(FAGERBERG, 1994), the Solow model is based on study may be divided into two groups. First, the
assumptions that cannot be easily defended. An variables that we wish explain, i.e. those we have
example is the assumption that technology is a public chosen to regard as endogenous. There are three of
good. In contrast, we have in previous work (FAGER- them, and they are all expressed as growth rates or
BERG, 1987; 1988; VERSPAGEN, 1991; CANIE È LS, ¯ ows: growth of GDP per capita; employment growth;
1996) analysed growth differences from a perspective and migration ¯ ows. These variables are clearly inter-
that acknowledges the joint private± public character dependent: higher growth is likely to lead to more
of technology. Following this perspective, innovations jobs, and job availability is generally recognized as an
diffuse through time and space, but diffusion depends important impetus to migration. The latter, in turn,
should be expected to feed back on GDP per capita. on capabilities, efforts and structural factors. In otherTechnology, Growth and Unemployment across European Regions 459
If inward migrants are relatively productive people, a Wage is the sum of wages divided by employment,
1989 (in 1990 PPPs to the Ecu); RDE is R&D positive effect may be envisaged. But if they tend to be
rather unproductive, their addition to the population employment in business enterprises in 1985 as a per-
centage of the labour force; PA is population density may actually lead to a fall in GDP per capita.
The second group consists of variables characterizing in 1985 (in thousands of persons per km
2); UE is the
unemployment rate in 1983;
6 MIR is the mean net the environment in which change istaking place. These
variables, normally expressed as levels or shares, are inward migration per thousand persons in the labour
force over 1983± 89; and AGR, IND and SER are the assumed to have an impact on the changes that take
place, but not the other way around (i.e. they are shares of agriculture, industry and services in total 1983
employment, respectively. exogenous).
4 Typically, these variables change very
slowly, so for a period of a decade or so, they can One of the novelties of this data set compared to the
one we used in previous work is the inclusion of data be taken as given. Examples include the industrial
for employment and net migration. Note, however, breakdown of GDP, the composition of the labour
that the migration data used in this paper only counts force, population density. In the longer term, of course,
migration within countries, not across. This implies an many such variables undergo important changes, which
underestimation of total migration, but perhaps not a would then have to be taken into account. Ideally, one
very serious one, since cross-border migration ¯ ows in would have wished to test for the assumed stability of
Europe are known to be small. However, the data also such structural factors. But due to lack of annual data
include persons that are not in the labour force. Hence, this was not possible. However, in the case of the rate
the data may in fact overestimate the actual ¯ ows of of unemployment, which might be considered as one
economically active migrants. Still, migration ¯ ows of the more problematic cases, we have at least two
appear small (see Table 1). In fact, in most regions, observations ± one towards the beginning and one
migration adds/subtracts far less than 0´5% per year to/ towards the end of our period. In Fig. 1 these observa-
from the labour force. It has to be stressed, though, tions are plotted against each other. The ® gure con® rms
that the relatively low migration rates do not necessarily that the distribution is essentially stable.
imply a small impact of migration on, for example, The de® nitions of the variables are as follows: GQ
economic growth. It may be the case, as suggested by stands for the average annual compound growth rate
BLANCHARD and KATZ, 1992, that the qualitative of GDP per capita (in 1990 PPPs ± Purchasing Power
effects of migration (for example, in terms of the Parities ± to the Ecu) over the period 1980± 1990; Q is
quality of the labour force, or spillover effects) may still the level of GDP per capita in 1980;
5 GE is the average
be quite substantial. annual compound growth rate of employment (in
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the variables persons) over 1983-89, and GN the average annual
employed in the study. In addition to the sample means, compound growth rate of the labour force (in persons);
the table includes means for four groups of regions
ranked from high to low depending on the level of
GDP per capita. As is evident from the table, there are
important differences between these groupings. At the
high end we ® nd many heavily urbanized regions,
characterized by low unemployment, high levels of
R&D and relatively high wages. At the opposite
extreme ± those with low GDP per capita ± we ® nd a
number of agricultural regions with low population
density, high unemployment and relatively low wages.
Hence, as shown in Fig. 2, the `poor’ regions ± those
with low GDP per capita ± also face the most serious
unemployment problems, and vice versa. Another
`stylized fact’ that comes out very clearly in the data is
the positive relationship between GDP per capita and
R&D (Fig. 3). Indeed, R&D efforts in the poor
regions are very close to zero while, in some advanced
regions, up to 2´5% of the business labour force is
made up of R&D personnel.
The evidence considered so far indicates a strong
polarization between regions with high and low levels
of GDP per capita (or rich and poor regions). There
are, however, some tendencies that qualify this pattern,
and these are worth brie¯y mentioning. First, it should Fig. 1. The persistence of unemployment levels across
European regions be noted that GDP per capita actually grows faster in460 Jan Fagerberg, Bart Verspagen and Marjolein Canie È ls
Table 1. Summary statistics for 64 European regions
Regional group (quartiles) means Total sample
1st (high) 2nd 3rd 4th (low) Standard
Variable quartile quartile quartile quartile Mean deviation
GQ 0´0186 0´0182 0´020 0´022 0´0196 0´0066
GE 0´0079 0´0051 0´008 0´012 0´0082 0´0097
GN 0´0072 0´0056 0´010 0´016 0´0098 0´0093
Q 15´510 12´685 10´871 7´953 11´755 3´089
Wage
1 23´993 23´066 20´871 19´669 21´713 2´441
RDE 1´013 0´548 0´338 0´081 0´495 0´588
PA 0´571 0´162 0´116 0´150 0´250 0´408
UE 0´070 0´075 0´107 0´144 0´099 0´042
MIR 70´00053 0´00084 0´00096 70´00187 70´00015 0´0039
AGR 0´057 0´094 0´129 0´227 0´127 0´086
IND 0´361 0´361 0´334 0´267 0´331 0´073
SER 0´582 0´545 0´537 0´505 0´542 0´076
Note: 1. Results for the Wage variable exclude observations for France, as French wage data was unavailable.
Fig. 2. Unemployment and GDP per capita across European Fig. 3. Innovation and GDP per capita across European
regions regions
the poor regions than in the others, although the proxied by R&D efforts, which is assumed to lead to
difference is not large. Employment grows faster too, higher growth in the region of origin. Hence, techno-
but so does the labour supply, so on balance un- logy is not regarded as a pure `public good’, as in
employment in the poor regions is on the increase. the traditional neoclassical perspective. Second, regions
Second, migration ¯ows are not mainly from poor may bene® t from diffusion; backward regions have a lot
regions to rich ones, as one might expect. Rather it is to learn by imitating the more advanced technologies
the regions in the middle ± those with close to average already in use elsewhere. As in most of the literature
GDP per capita ± that attract most migration. on technology gaps, we use the distance in GDP per
capita between the region in question and that of the
frontier region as a proxy for the potential for imitation EXP LORING THE RELATIONSHIP (i.e. we include the log of initial GDP per capita in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY, GROWTH the equation for growth). AND EMP LOYMENT Whether this potential is exploited or not depends
on a number of factors. Although R&D is taken here Regions may bene® t from technology in two different
ways. First, regions may bene® t from innovation, as a measure of innovative efforts, it is also importantTechnology, Growth and Unemployment across European Regions 461
for imitation, since a certain level of R&D is a pre- demand for a region’s products. However, since ± as
might be expected ± these structural variables turned condition for successful imitation in many cases
(COHEN and LEVINTHAL, 1989). Another factor that out to be closely correlated, we chose to include only
one of them (AGR). The equation for growth, then, has been identi® ed in the literature is investment in
physical capital. However, recent theoretical work is the following:
(ROMER, 1990; GROSSMAN and HELPMAN, 1991)
GQi5 c11 a1log(Qi)1 a2RDEi1 a3PAi1 a4AGRi has disputed the explanatory value of investment on
1 b1MIRi (1) the grounds that it is an effect, and not a cause, of
economic growth. In a previous paper (FAGERBERG
Although migration may play a role in the growth and VERSPAGEN, 1996) we showed that differences process, there is also ample evidence of a feedback from across European regions in investment activity did not growth on migration. For instance, potential migrants contribute to the explanation of differences in growth take job availability into account when they make of GDP per capita. The same was shown to be the their decisions, and job growth depends on economic case for regional support from the European Union.
7
growth. Other variables that have been identi® ed in We do not repeat these exercises here, partly because the literature as important for migration ¯ows include this would not add much to existing knowledge in this unemployment, wage-levels and population density area, and partly because doing so would have implied (BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN, 1991, 1992; BLAN-
a considerable reduction in the size of the sample
CHARD and KATZ, 1992; NEVEN and GOUYETTE, (since these additional variables are not available for all 1995). In short, people are assumed to migrate from regions). areas with high unemployment, low wages and high We extend our previous analysis in two ways. First, population density (congestion problems) to areas we take into account the suggestion from the literature where job opportunities and pay are better and living on regional economics that migration may be a source conditions more pleasant. The evidence concerning of convergence in GDP per capita in its own right the impact of these factors is somewhat contradictory, (BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN, 1991). Assume, for though. BLANCHARD and KATZ, 1992, in a very the purpose of illustration, that migrants are not eco- thorough study based on US data, point to differences nomically active. Then, if people leave regions with in unemployment, rather than wages, as the main low levels of GDP per capita and join those with high impetus to migration. NEVEN and GOUYETTE, 1995, levels, GDP per capita will increase in the former and reach the opposite conclusion in the case of Europe, decrease in the latter, i.e. convergence in GDP per but their sample was limited to two countries only capita will occur. However, if migrants are very pro- (UK and Italy). BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN (1991, ductive people, perhaps because they are better edu- 1992) do not include unemployment as a possible cated and/or more innovative than others, this might source of migration. They conclude that `the main be different. Evidence from the USA and Japan seems results for Japan and the United States are similar: to indicate that the latter may be closer to the truth people move away from highly populated areas and than the former (BARRO and SALA-I-MARTIN, 1991, into high-income areas’ (1992, p. 339). 1992). This leads us to use the following equation for Second, following some of the recent literature on migration: economic geography (KRUGMAN, 1991, among
others), we allow for the possibility that scale economies MIRi5 c21 c1PAi1 c2RWi1 c3UEi1 b2GEi (2)
may result in higher growth in areas with high popula-
RW ± relative wages ± is the (log of) the wage level in tion density (so-called agglomeration). Some prelimi-
nary work on US data seems to support this suggestion the region divided by the average wage level in the
country to which the region belongs.
9 Since cross- (CICCONE and HALL, 1996). As in our previous
work, we also include a structural variable, the share of country migration ¯ ows are not included in our migra-
tion ® gures, it was deemed natural to adjust the wage agriculture in GDP, which is assumed to act as a
constraint on productivity growth (because of the lim- variable by taking out the part of the total variance
that refers to cross-country differences in wage levels. ited scope for technological progress and growth in
agriculture). We also considered other structural vari- However, we are interested not only in the relation-
ship between growth of GDP per capita and migration ables: the shares of industry and services in GDP (IND,
SER); and the STRUC variable suggested by BARRO behaviour, but also in the outcome for employment.
We therefore include a separate equation for employ- and SALA-I-MARTIN (1991, 1992).
8 Basically, the
latter is a synthetic measure of the economic structure ment growth. While it seems reasonable to model
migration behaviour from the standpoint of the indi- of the region, with the relative size of each sector
weighted by the average growth of that sector for the vidual job-seeker, employment growth is, to a much
larger extent, the result of decisions by ® rms. From EU as a whole. If we apply a small open economy
perspective to European regions, then this variable may this perspective, low wages should, ceteris paribus, be
considered advantageous for job creation. Unemploy- be interpreted as re¯ ecting the growth of external462 Jan Fagerberg, Bart Verspagen and Marjolein Canie È ls
ment, on the other hand, may have a dual impact. On The estimates for the migration equation con® rm
the one hand it signals availability of labour; on the the hypothesis that people migrate from regions with
other it suggests a state of economic depression that high unemployment to areas where job opportunities
may not be so good for business after all (BLANCHARD are better (employment growth). The other two vari-
and KATZ, 1992). A high population density may be ables, relative wages and population density, both have
good for employment growth, since it attracts ® rms the expected signs, but neither of them is signi® cant.
and industries for whom proximity is an important Hence, as in the study by BLANCHARD and KATZ,
competitive factor, and allows for a deeper specializa- 1992, on US data, unemployment appears to be more
tion of labour. Higher overall growth(GDP per capita) important than relative wages in stimulating migration.
should, ceteris paribus, be expected to be good for Thus, our results do not con® rm those reported by
employment. Finally, we take into account the fact that NEVEN and GOUYETTE, 1995, for a smaller sample
European agriculture was under severe pressure during (two EU countries).
the 1980s, and that this may have affected employment Employment growth responds positively to growth
growth in agricultural regions negatively. The equation in demand (GDP per capita), and negatively to high
we use is: relative wages. The assumed negative effect on employ-
ment of agriculture is also con® rmed. Population den-
GEi5 c31 d 1UEi1 d 2RWi1 d 3AGRi1 d 4PAi1 b3GQi sity has a positive effect, as suggested, but this effect is
(3) not very signi® cant. Also unemployment failed to have
a signi® cant impact on employment growth, perhaps As iscustomary in work on pooled samples, we estimate
because the two mechanisms mentioned above the above regressions including country-dummies.
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counteract one another. This implies that we do not try to explain why, say, all
By solving the equations (1)± (3) for the endogenous Spanish regions grow faster than all German ones, but
variables, using the estimates from Table 2 above, we focus on growth differences between regions within
may get a better grasp of what explains the differences countries. Thus, to the extent that there are important
in growth and employment across European regions. differences between these countries at the country level
These reduced-form equations may then be used to (such as growth of overall demand, for instance), these
decompose predicted growth in GDP per capita and will be accounted for by the dummies. To avoid
employment into its various components (i.e. our exo- simultaneous equation bias, we estimate equations (1)±
genous variables). The reduced form equations are (2) using a 2SLS (instrumental variables) procedure,
reported in Table 3, while Table 4 gives the decomposi- using all the exogenous variables included in the three
tion of the growth rates into the different effects.
12 The equations, plus IND and STRUC as instruments.
11
® rst column (mean) in Table 4 shows how the model The results of the estimations of these equations are
explains the growth of GDP per capita for an `average’ reported in Table 2. Basically, the results con® rm many
European region (de® ned as having mean values of all of our priors. Both the scope for imitation and R&D
variables). Both the potential for catch-up and R&D turn up as important for growth. Migration is found
efforts emerge as important for growth, as do the to have a strong, positive impact on GDP per capita
economic structure (share of agriculture in GDP) and growth, consistent with previous ® ndings. A high share
the level of unemployment. There is also a sizeable of agriculture in GDP acts as a constraint on growth,
constant term (including country dummies) which we as expected. However, there is not much support in
will have more to say about below. these data for the agglomeration hypothesis. In fact,
More interesting, perhaps, is how this model explains population density has a negative sign (although it is
not signi® cant). the differences in GDP per capita growth between
Table 2. Estimation results
1
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables
Dependent Adjusted
variable R
2 n GQ MIR GE log(Q) RDE AGR UE PA RW
GQ 0´31 64 0´96 70´015 0´008 70´027 70´0014
t-values 2´51**
2 2´39** 2´80*** 2´06** 0´28
MIR 0´38 64 0´388 70´07 70´0014 0´0024
t-values 5´15*** 5´17*** 0´56 0´44
GE 0´71 64 0´624 70´060 70´03 0´0031 70´057
t-values 3´49*** 4´00*** 0´83 1´19 4´00***
Notes: 1. Estimated by instrument variables (2SLS) with all exogenous variables and IND and STRUC as instruments.
2. Two and three stars denote signi® cance at a 5% or 1% level in a two-tailed t-test, respectively, using heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors. Country dummies are not explicitly documented.Technology, Growth and Unemployment across European Regions 463
Table 3. Reduced form equations for growth of GDP per capita and growth of employment
Exogenous variables
Dependent
variable log(Q) RDE AGR UE PA RW DIT DFR DES constant
GQ 70´0195 0´0102 70´0643 70´10 70´0021 70´0247 0´0165 0´0044 0´0231 0´0707
GE 70´0122 0´0063 70´1001 70´09 0´0018 70´0724 0´0081 70´0015 0´0284 0´0487
Table 4. Why growth rates of GDP per capita and employ- have been factors in this. At least, the potential for
catch-up was substantial. In fact, in 1980 GDP per ment differ (%)
capita in Spain was only 60% of that in Germany. GDP per capita Employment
The third and fourth columns in Table 4 give similar
Low- Low- predictions for employment growth. In general, the
Mean high Mean high estimation results show that what is good for GDP per
(1) (2) (1) (2)
capita growth tends to be good for employment growth
Catch-up 1´3 1´3 0´8 0´8 as well. However, catch-up and R&D have a smaller
R&D 0´5 70´9 0´3 70´6 impact on differences in employment growth than on
Population density 70´1 0´1 0´0 70´1 differences in growth of GDP per capita. Moreover, Structure 70´8 71´1 71´3 71´7
although relative wages do not matter much for growth, Unemployment 71´0 70´7 70´9 70´7
this variable has a sizeable impact on employment. This Wages 0´0 0´3 0´0 0´9
Constant 1´0 1´1 favours employment growth in the poorer regions.
Country speci® c 1´1 1´4 0´8 1´9 Also, an unfavourable industrial structure (i.e. a large
Total of above 2´1 0´3 0´9 0´5 agricultural sector) is even more damaging for employ- Actual 2´0 0´3 0´8 0´4
ment growth than for growth of GDP per capita. The
Notes: 1. Decomposition of the growth rates of an `average’ region table also reveals that employment actually grows faster
in our sample (point of gravity of the regression). in poor regions. However, this ismore than outweighed
2. Decomposition of the difference in growth rates between
by more rapid growth of the labour supply there (see `rich’ and `poor’ regions in our sample.
Table 1). As a result, differences in unemployment
levels between poor and rich regions tend to increase,
rather than the other way around. rich and poor regions. This is illustrated in the second
column of Table 4 (low± high). Catch-up emerges as
the most important factor for the poor regions, but CONCLUSIONS this advantage is to a large extent eroded by the
much higher R&D efforts in the rich regions. The This paper has tried to explore the relationship between
technology, growth and employment growth across performance of the poor regions is also signi® cantly
negatively affected by their industrial structure (charac- European regions. We have been motivated by the fact,
laid out in the second section of this paper, that levels terized by a large agricultural sector) and high levels of
unemployment. Finally, the growth of the poor regions of GDP per capita and unemployment seem to be
inversely related, i.e. that poor regions also tend to is positively affected by country speci® c factors.
Regarding the latter, it can be shown that the have high unemployment, and vice versa. Another
source of inspiration has been our previous ® nding country-speci® c factors partly responsible for the differ-
ence in GDP per capita growth between poor and (FAGERBERG and VERSPAGEN, 1996) that un-
employment seems to affect economic growth nega- rich regions all relate to one country (or dummy
variable), i.e. Spain. This isnot necessarily so surprising, tively. Taken together these ® ndings suggest the
possibility of a `high unemployment± low GDP per since most of the poor regions in our sample are
Spanish. It should be noted, also, that the very inclusion capita trap’ in Europe. Arguably, this may have strong
implications for European `cohesion’. of country-speci® c factors in the regressions implies
that the differences in, say, growth of GDP per capita The explanation offered by the model for the nega-
tive correlation between growth and unemployment, between Spain and other countries will be explained
by these dummies and not by the other variables is that unemployment affects growth negatively through
its negative impact on inward migration (and positive included in the regressions. Thus, what this result tells
us is simply that, on average, all Spanish regions grew impact on outward migration). In fact, net inward
migration was found to have a strong, positive impact faster than regions from other countries. Why this is
so we do not know. But is tempting to suggest that on growth. Unemployment acts as a factor that limits
net inward migration and, hence, growth. catching up (between Spain and more advanced coun-
tries such as Germany) during the 1980s, as well as the Regarding the persistence of high rates of un-
employment in regions with low GDP per capita, the entry of Spain into the European Community, may464 Jan Fagerberg, Bart Verspagen and Marjolein Canie È ls
explanation seems to be that although employment encouraging R&D in backward regions is not simply
a matter of subsidizing these activities. R&D is typically grows somewhat faster in poorer regions (a fact attri-
buted by our model mainly to a large scope for catch- an activity that can only be undertaken in the context
of an adequate infrastructure, i.e. when suf® cient high up and relatively low wages, in combination with
country speci® c factors), it does not grow rapidly quality labour and supporting institutions such as higher
education institutions are available. Policies aimed at enough to keep up with the growth of labour supply,
which is also higher in more backward regions. Hence, R&D thus have an essential long-run and structural
character, both in terms of implementation and effect. unemployment rates in backward regions tend to
increase rather than the other way around. Second, the ® ndings presented here point to eco-
nomic structure, i.e. the dominant role played by What are the policy implications of this study? First,
note that some of the traditional policy recipes, such agriculture in many poor regions, as an important
barrier to growth of employment and GDP per capita as encouraging migration and reducing wages in areas
with high unemployment, do not necessarily alleviate in backward regions. Thus, rather than conserve the
existing economic structure by such means as the the problem of a `high unemployment± low GDP per
capita trap’. In our model, migration ¯ ows are assumed Common Agricultural Policy, policy should be aimed
at changing it. to have a symmetrical impact on growth, i.e. inward
migration increases growth, while outward migration It is, however, pertinent to stress that these conclu-
sions rest on a number of assumptions which, although decreases it. The estimated impact is quite large,
although the ¯ ows are rather small (compared, for defendable, are not always tested (or even testable).
One main reason for this is lack of data. For instance, instance, to the number of unemployed in high un-
employment areas). Hence, increased migration would if (for some variable) data is available for a single year
only, econometric testing is necessarily limited. Rather be likely to increase the differences in GDP per capita
between rich and poor regions, while having only a than following the common practice of ignoring
important variables for which data are scarce, we have relatively modest impact on the recorded levels of
unemployment in poor regions.
13 A reduction in wages, in this paper tried to do much with little. Without
denying the limitations that this places on the generality on the other hand, might have a more substantial effect
on unemployment. But, in our model, this reduction of the analysis, we nevertheless hope that this paper
may provide some useful inputs to the debate about in unemployment in the poor regions (due to a
lowering of wages there) will occur at the expense of EU policy and regional policy in particular.
the workers in rich regions. The explanation is again
one of symmetry, reduced relative wages ± and more
jobs ± in the poor regions ceteris paribus transmits itself Acknowledgements ± Financial support from European
into increased relative wages in rich regions and, hence, Union’s Targeted Socio-economic Research Programme is
fewer jobs in the latter. Thus, increased inequality gratefully acknowledged, as is support from the Norwegian
between workers in poor and rich regions ± through a Research Council. Bart Verspagen’s research has been made
widening of the difference in wage levels ± will not possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy
of Arts and Sciences. cure the present high level of unemployment in the
European Union, but it may contribute to a different
regional distribution of unemployment. Whether this
is an acceptable policy option or not is not for us to NOTES
decide. However, it may be dif® cult to combine such
1. Note that a similar, though not identical, process can be
a policy with the current aim in the EU to create a shown to have taken place in the US and Japan (BARRO
truly common European labour market. and SALA-I-MARTIN, 1992). This suggests that the
Fortunately, our analysis indicates that there are other factors responsible for these developments may be rather
policy options that may have a more promising impact. general in nature, rather than country or region speci® c.
First, encouraging R&D in backward regions appears This is not inconsistent with the perspective we apply
here, but we do not attempt to explain developments crucial. Today, R&D is very unevenly distributed across
outside Europe. Europe, with little or no R&D in most poor regions.
2. DUNFORD, 1996, provides additional evidence on the However, without well-developed R&D capabilities,
relationship between GDP per capita and un- backward regions will ® nd it increasingly dif® cult to
employment across European regions. exploit the potential for learning offered by more
3. In the REGIO database, regions are identi® ed in the advanced technology developed elsewhere. Moreover,
NUTS-scheme. We use both NUTS 2-digit and 3-
in contrast to migration or relative wages, this is not a digit level regions, depending on data availability and
zero-sum game. Hence, an increase in R&D in, say, the country. A listing of regions is in the Appendix table.
the poor regions will ± according to our model (and 4. The only variable in this latter group that re¯ects change
much recent theorizing in this area) ± lead to higher is the growth of labour supply (GN). This variable, it
growth in poor areas without necessarily decreasing may be noted, is not included in any of the models/
regressions presented later, but used to illustrate the joint growth elsewhere. However, it needs to be stressed thatTechnology, Growth and Unemployment across European Regions 465
impact of growth in the demand for and supply of labour APPENDIX
on unemployment.
Regions used in the regression analysis 5. GDP per capita is closely related to income per head.
This is why we sometimes denote regions with low NUTS
GDP per capita as `poor’ and regions with high GDP Number code Country Region
per capita as `rich’. We use national price indices and
1 r11 Germany Baden-Wuerttemberg purchasing power parities to the Ecu, because region-
2 r12 Germany Bayern speci® c data for these variables are lacking. 3 r13 Germany Berlin
6. Unemployment, employment and the labour force data 4 r15 Germany Bremen
in the EUROSTAT REGIO database generally are 5 r16 Germany Hamburg
not available for years before 1983, so we are forced to 6 r17 Germany Hessen
7 r19 Germany Niedersachsen use the 1983 value as the initial year.
8 r1a Germany Nordrhein-Westfalen 7. This applies to support through the so-called European
9 r1b Germany Rheinland-Pfalz Regional Development Fund, which is the main source
10 r1c Germany Saarland for regional support at the EU level. Loans from the
11 r1f Germany Schleswig-Holstein
European Investment Bank (and supporting schemes), 12 r311 Italy Piemonte
though much smaller in size, were found to have a more 13 r313 Italy Liguria
positive impact, however. 14 r32 Italy Lombardia
15 r331 Italy Trentino-Alto Adige 8. This is de® ned as S jsijyj, where yj is the European wide
16 r332 Italy Veneto growth rate of GDP in sector j (agriculture, industry or
17 r333 Italy Friuli-Venez. Giulia services), and sij is the share of sector j in GDP in
18 r34 Italy Emilia-Romagna region i.
19 r351 Italy Toscana 9. Since we lacked wage data for France, we estimated 20 r352 Italy Umbria
these data on the basis of a linear regression of RW on 21 r353 Italy Marche
a similarly constructed variable for GDP per capita for 22 r36 Italy Lazio
the other countries in our sample. 23 r37 Italy Abruzzo-Molise
24 r38 Italy Campania 10. Technically speaking, we have three country dummies
25 r391 Italy Puglia and a common constant term, which amounts to the
26 r392 Italy Basilicata same thing.
27 r393 Italy Calabria 11. We cannot include SER, since SER, IND and AGR
28 r3a Italy Sicilia
sum to one. 29 r3b Italy Sardegna
12. In order to quantify the effect of catching-up, we 30 r21 France Ile de France
substituted the log of GDP per capita by a similar 31 r221 France Champagne
32 r222 France Picardie variable, but expressed relative to GDP per capita in the
33 r223 France Haute Normandie `richest’ region in the sample. At the same time, we add
34 r224 France Centre the log of GDP per capita in the `richest’ region in the
35 r225 France Basse Normandie sample multiplied by the catching-up coef® cient to the
36 r226 France Bourgogne constant term, thus leaving the statistical and arithmetical 37 r23 France Nord-Pas-de Calais
characteristics of the equation unchanged. 38 r241 France Lorraine
13. If the impact is not symmetrical, for instance because 39 r242 France Alsace
inward migration has a larger quantitative effect than 40 r243 France Franche-Comte Â
41 r251 France Pays de la Loire outward migration, migration may also have an impact
42 r252 France Bretagne on the average growth rate of GDP per capita. However,
43 r253 France Poitou-Charentes as long as this does not change the qualitative impact of
44 r261 France Aquitaine migration ¯ ows, one would still expect migration to
45 r262 France Midi-Pyre Â ne Â es
drag down growth in poor regions (although less than 46 r263 France Limousin
in the case of symmetrical effects). 47 r271 France Rho Ã ne-Alpes
48 r272 France Auvergne
49 r281 France Languedoc-Roussillon
50 rb11 Spain Galicia
51 rb12 Spain Principado de Asturias
52 rb13 Spain Cantabria
53 rb21 Spain Pais Vasco
54 rb22 Spain Comunidad Foral de Navarra
55 rb23 Spain La Rioja
56 rb3 Spain Comunidad de Madrid
57 rb41 Spain Castilla y Leo Â n
58 rb42 Spain Castilla-la Mancha
59 rb43 Spain Extremadura
60 rb51 Spain Catalun Ä a
61 rb52 Spain Comunidad Valenciana
62 rb53 Spain Islas Baleares
63 rb61 Spain Andalucia
64 rb62 Spain Regio Â n de Murcia466 Jan Fagerberg, Bart Verspagen and Marjolein Canie È ls
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